MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: A HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED

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ABSTRACT
With the League of Nations’ inability to maintain international peace and security the Allied Powers of World War II began to work on the creation of an international organization that would be more efficient and powerful in matters of international peace and security. The result was the establishment of United Nations (UN) in 1945. Although the system envisaged in the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security resembled that of the League of Nations it differed on a crucial point. The responsibility for maintaining international peace and security was given to a smaller body, the Security Council (SC). However the inability of the members of the SC (United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China) to maintain cooperation after the war led to a deadlock in the SC. The improvised response to the deadlock was the establishment of “Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).” This system became the most effective tool of the UN in dealing with matters concerning international peace and security. Thus, the purpose of this article is to discuss how the notion of Peacekeeping developed, general characteristics and whether it proved to be a success or failure during the Cold War.

THE UN AND THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

While preparing a mechanism for dealing with matters concerning international peace and security the point of departure for the drafters of the UN Charter was the League of Nations experience. Thus, although the League proved unsuccessful in its quest to preserve the peace the experiences provided lessons for the founders of the UN about how to structure a collective security system (Weiss, et al., 1994: 20). One of the most important handicaps of the League was its inability to act collectively in international crises because of the fact that all decisions had to be taken unanimously and that the members had the right to refuse in taking part in League’s activities (Weiss, et al., 1994: 21). Such a strict procedure often deadlocked the League, and destroyed the very basic premise of the collective security system on which the League
founded upon. In its simplest terms, the collective security system adopts a universalistic approach in that it requires the commitment of the entire world community to a system in which all states agree to take common action to overcome international violence and end the threat to peace (Howard, 1993: 30). However, given the anarchical state of the international system it proved impossible for the League to reconcile the ambitions of all of its members. Subsequent developments, such as the Japanese and Italian aggressions against Manchuria and Ethiopia respectively, further contributed to the deterioration of the League’s authority leaving it totally powerless with the outbreak of the Second World War.

Thus, the League provided crucial experience for the drafters of the UN Charter to create a more efficient and powerful collective security mechanism with effective enforcement measures against aggression. Besides a body involving all members of the organization, that is, the General Assembly, a smaller body would be established responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The successful cooperation of the Allied powers during the Second World War led to the belief that the most effective way to ensure international peace and security was to have the great powers working together to combat aggression (Boulden, 1993: 1). Therefore that smaller body would be composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China and France, which were the victorious and the most powerful states at the end of the Second World War. The UN Charter refers to this body as the Security Council the functions and powers of which are outlined in Chapter V. These five great powers of the Security Council are permanent members having the power to veto decisions. “The permanent members’ veto powers ensure that on important questions they agree, or at least abstain.

It was recognized that no enforcement action could take place against one of the great powers of the international system without creating a major war – the very thing that the UN had been established to prevent. By preventing action against a permanent member, the veto saved the organization from wrecking itself in destructive operations against its most powerful members. Enforcement actions [could] only be taken with great-power cooperation” (Weiss, et al., 1994: 25). Article 25 of the UN Charter states, “the members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC in accordance with the present Charter.” Thus, through the binding character of the Security Council, the drafters of the UN aimed at overcoming the main weakness of the League, that is, absence of collective action.

The mechanism for dealing with issues concerning international peace and security is laid down in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI encourages the parties to a conflict to solve their dispute through peaceful means such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement (article 33) without undermining the authority of the Security Council since article 34 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” Chapter VII on the other hand refers to coercive measures should peaceful means prove inadequate. Article 41 of the Charter involves measures excluding the use of armed forces such as “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” The Security Council, by virtue of article 42, is entitled to use military force, as a last resort, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If the Security Council was to conduct military operations it was to have military forces at its disposal. The armed forces and other facilities are to be supplied by the member states through special agreements with the Security Council (article 43, paragraph 1). The military operations are to be carried out by the Military Staff Committee, which is composed of Chiefs of Staffs of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The collective security system that the UN Charter envisaged looked good on paper, but it was never utilized during the Cold War, except on rare occasions. As mentioned earlier, the drafters of the UN Charter, that is, the five great powers moved with the assumption that the cooperation among them would continue. However, by 1948 the world had been divided into two ideologically rival camps paralyzing the UN system of collective security.

“The first victim of the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union” (Boulden, 1993: 9) was the Military Staff Committee. Between 1946 and 1948 the Military Staff Committee worked on the composition, organization and number of military forces but in August 1948 the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee declared that the Committee had reached deadlock (Boulden, 1993: 9). By 1946 mutual mistrust between the Soviet Union and the United States had already begun to build up each being apprehensive of the other’s motives and throughout the Cold War the Military Staff Committee was never operationalized.
THE BIRTH OF PEACEKEEPING

The Korean War (1951)

Although not a peacekeeping operation the Korean War of 1950 marks a major turning point in the history of the UN because it was during this war that the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which opened the way for the establishment of peacekeeping operations, was adopted. Therefore The Korean War deserves careful analysis. When North Korea attacked South in 1950, this served as a test case so as to see whether the permanent members of the UN could overcome their ideological differences. However, the Korean case demonstrated that no collective action would be possible because it became clear that ideological rivalry surpassed concerns for international peace and security. During the initial stages of the conflict the absence of the Soviet delegate enabled the remaining members of the Security Council to act under Chapter VII and pass a resolution “calling for the establishment of a unified command under the United States command to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (Fetherston, 1994: 11). However, as soon as the Soviet delegate returned the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet vet and no further action regarding the Korean operation was possible. The deadlock in the Security Council was overcome through the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ which was passed with the initiatives of the Western powers (3 November 1950). The resolution states, “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appear to be a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Howard, 1993: 67). The adoption of the resolution implied that the Security Council’s “formal responsibility of maintaining peace was ‘primary’ but not ‘exclusive’” (Weiss, et al., 1994: 27).

The Korean affair had some profound consequences that influenced the structuring of future security operations. First and foremost, it became clear that under the prevailing international system it would not be possible for the Security Council to implement the provisions of Chapter VII. The enforcement action during the Korean case was possible only because the Soviet delegate was absent in the Security Council, and the Soviets would never allow the same thing happen again. The continuance of the operation was maintained through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which implicated that the General Assembly would assume more responsibility in matters of international peace and security than the Security Council from then on. How much power could the General Assembly exert through this resolution, however, still depended on the attitudes of the great powers, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, to particular international crises. For instance, the General Assembly proved to be unsuccessful in utilizing the Uniting for Peace Resolution against Soviet action in Hungary in 1956, but was fairly successful during the Suez crisis in the same year. Thus, in order to assure success there was still a need for cooperation or at least indifference on the part of one of the great powers.

The Suez Crisis (1956)

The UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I), which was established during the Suez crisis of 1956, was the first force-level peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. It was also the first mission that was officially referred to as peacekeeping. Before UNEF I the UN established two missions, the mandates of which were to observe cease-fires reached by the warring parties. Neither of these missions was named peacekeeping nor did they include any military force.

The crisis, which led to the establishment of UNEF I, began in July 1956 with Egyptian President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The crisis gained an international character when Israel attacked Egypt shortly after the announcement of the nationalization. The situation further deteriorated when Britain and France, intervened allegedly “on behalf of the international community to protect and isolate a waterway essential to international commerce from a local war” (Abi-Saab, 1995: 1). However, the fact that Britain and France were the principal shareholders of the Suez Canal made it clear that they were not acting on
behalf of the international community but rather to protect their own interests.

Furthermore, the British and French vetoes paralyzed the Security Council, making the UN totally powerless, again, in an international crisis. Therefore, the matter, as in the Korean case, was once again transferred to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Although the General Assembly called on the parties to an immediate cease-fire, this was ignored by all the parties to the conflict. Finally, the General Assembly established United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first level peacekeeping operation in the history of the organization. Under Resolution 1000 adopted by the General Assembly, the mandate of UNEF comprised the following:

to secure and supervise a cease-fire by forming a buffer zone between Anglo-French-Israeli and Egyptian forces;

to supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and the canal clearing operations;

to patrol border areas and deter military incursions;

to secure the provisions of the Egypt-Israel armistice agreements (Ghali, 1993: 109).

Because the UN had never established a force-level peacekeeping operation there was nothing before the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to serve as an example. Thus, he and his staff’s decisions regarding the Force’s command structure, logistics, composition and funding were improvised (Ghali, 1993: 127). For the size, type and equipment of troops Dag Hammarskjold consulted Lieutenant General who, at that time was the Force Commander of UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was established in 1948 the mandate of which was, and still is, to supervise truces between Israel and its Arab neighbors through observer groups deployed along the borders of Israel and those of its neighbors (Weiss, et al., 1994: 42).

The Force would be deployed only on the territory of Egypt since Israel did not give its consent to such a UN presence on its own territory. Accordingly, Dag Hammarskjold and Egyptian President Nasser, signed a memorandum stating that the presence of UNEF was dependent on continued Egyptian consent. The Force would be composed of voluntary contributions of contingents from the members of the UN because the agreements that would activate the Military Staff Committee were not signed due to the imperatives of the Cold War. Since none of the permanent members of the Security Council were politically neutral to the crisis and since the crisis was to be isolated from great power rivalries Dag Hammarskjold preferred to choose small and neutral countries to contribute to the Force. The Force would be lightly armed since it did not have a combatant character and was not a party to the conflict. Force would be used only as a last resort and for the purpose of self-defense.

As for the funding, the UN Secretary-General recommended that the Force be funded through the regular UN budget. His recommendation, however, caused much debate in the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites argued that the cost of the operation should be borne by the aggressors in the crisis, in that case, Britain, France and Israel refusing to pay their share for the costs of the operation. This debate continued in subsequent crises and brought UN on the verge of bankruptcy in some cases.

On 12 November 1956 the military contingents began to arrive at UNEF’s temporary headquarters in Cairo (Ghali, 1993: 116). UNEF operated until 1967 and successfully fulfilled the mandate conveyed to it. In May 1967 UNEF had to withdraw upon the request of the Egyptian government and the shortly after that the Six Day War broke out between Egypt and Israel.

In terms of the mandate conveyed to it UNEF successfully fulfilled it: by December 1956 all British and French forces were withdrawn from the Egyptian territory, followed by complete withdrawal of Israeli troops by March 1957. The Suez Canal was reopened in December 1956. UNEF was also successful in forming a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel, thus preventing the recurrence of fighting. Furthermore, while allowing Britain and France to withdraw without disgrace (Fetherston, 1994: 13) UNEF also proved successful in preventing the conflict to become a battlefield of great power confrontation. The success of UNEF increased the UN’s credibility in dealing with international crises in addition to establishing a model in dealing with subsequent conflicts.

Since it became clear that the UN would not be able to resort to Chapter VII arrangements from then on peacekeeping operations became the most effective tool of the organization in preventing local conflicts turning into major wars. During the Cold War 13 peacekeeping operations were established by the UN five of which are still operational today. Although each case was unique and was established in an ad hoc manner there developed a series of principles that served as guidelines for the
establishment of peacekeeping operations which will be discussed below.

**ASSESSMENT OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE COLD WAR ERA**

**Characteristics of Peacekeeping Operations**

Characterized by great power rivalry the primary task of Cold War peacekeeping was to prevent local conflicts turning into major wars which had the potential of bringing the rival camps into direct confrontation. As the term *peacekeeping* denotes the aim of peacekeeping operations was not to bring a solution to the problems of the conflicting parties but it was rather a tool for setting the necessary peaceful environment “which gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q2.htm: 2005].” Therefore the tasks assigned to peacekeepers were limited hence the operations served a limited purpose, which is, keeping the *peace*, not imposing any solution to the parties in conflict.

The peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era are divided into two broad categories: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. The observer missions are composed of usually unarmed military observers the tasks of which include observing cease-fires, detecting and reporting on the violations of the cease-fires and supervising troop withdrawals. As neutral observers, peacekeepers can ensure that none of the protagonists perform actions that violate the agreement that established the peacekeeping operation and the cessation of military hostilities (Diehl. 1993: 9). The peacekeeping forces on the other hand are composed of national contingents. The primary responsibility of a peacekeeping force is to separate the warring parties through interposing themselves between them. Through such a buffer zone the conflicting parties are prevented from direct contact which lessens the possibility of hostile incidents that could escalate into a full-scale war. Although the peacekeepers are lightly armed and cannot prevent a conflicting party from crossing the buffer zone it is not the arms but the moral weight that the peacekeeping force exerts. Hence, a state may be reluctant to use military force if it knows that military offensives must go through UN forces, risking loss of life and international condemnation (Diehl, 1993: 10). In addition to that, the function of a peacekeeping force may encompass that of an observer mission. The most striking feature of peacekeeping operations is that they are non-coercive actions although they are essentially military in nature. Thus, peacekeeping is a non-threatening activity. This is crucial for the simple reason that if the operation, for some reason or other, abandons its non-threatening posture then it will inevitably become party to the dispute and hence lose its claim to be a peacekeeping body (Shanin and Malik, 1996: 15). Therefore the peacekeeping operation singles out no one as the aggressor and blames no one for the conflict nor does it attempt to impose its will on the warring parties.

Another feature of peacekeeping is that—as the term ‘peacekeeping’ itself suggests- a peacekeeping force usually deploys in areas where there is a *peace* to be kept. In other words, a peacekeeping force is not designed to restore order or stop the fighting between rival enemies. Therefore, if the warring parties have a desire to let the UN handle the conflict then they must at least agree to a cease-fire. Although in some cases the UN faced situations where there was no peace to keep, it resorted to minimal use of force and tried to persuade the warring parties to a cease-fire through the efforts of mediation and negotiation.

**Elements of Success in a Peacekeeping Mission**

As mentioned earlier the term ‘peacekeeping’ is not defined in the UN Charter. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no established rules or guidelines for peacekeeping that distinguishes it from collective security or any other form of military action. In fact the UN had to find its own way through gaining experience and learning lessons from each and every peacekeeping operation that it had conducted. Thus, over time there developed several principles on which the success of a peacekeeping operation depended. The lack of any of these principles often produced undesirable results for the UN and cast a shadow to the success of the operations. Among these principles, the consent of the parties to the conflict, the impartiality of the UN peacekeeping force, and non-use of force stand out as the most important ones which have been determining factors of the success of a peacekeeping operation. Although the nature and scope of peacekeeping operations changed drastically in the post-Cold War Era these principles are still relevant if success of an operation is desired.
The Consent of the Parties to the Conflict

The first and most important prerequisite to the success of a peacekeeping operation is the consent of the host state. For example, during the Suez crisis of 1956 UN peacekeeping forces were only deployed on the territory of Egypt since Israel did not give permission to UN presence on its own territory. Any attempt to deploy peacekeeping without the approval of the host state, on the other hand, would defeat the very purpose of limiting hostilities in the area since such an action would precipitate attacks on peacekeepers by the host country. Therefore the consent of the host state “greatly reduces the likelihood that peacekeepers will encounter resistance while carrying out their duties (Weiss et al., 1994: 52).” The consent of the host state also shows that there is at least nominal commitment to peace. It should be noted, however, that the consent of the host state to the presence of a UN peacekeeping force in its territory “does not constitute an indefinite legal right for the operation; it may be withdrawn any time (Diehl, 1993: 9).” For instance, in 1967, just before launching an attack against Israel the Egyptian President Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UNEF. Under such circumstances there is little option for the UN but to withdraw.

The Impartiality of the UN Peacekeeping Force

The impartiality of the peacekeeping force suggests that the UN peacekeepers have no initial bias toward either side and thus cannot be party to any conflict either domestic or international nor they would resort to actions, which favor one side or the other. Therefore, to achieve impartiality, the UN has refrained from including contingents from the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the peacekeeping forces hence such an act would be against the very purpose of the mission, that is, isolating local conflicts from the Cold War context. In addition to that the UN was careful in not including military contingents from countries which had a direct interest in the conflict at hand. Thus, the UN peacekeeping forces would normally be composed of small and nonaligned states although there are exceptional cases where one or more Permanent Members of the Security Council stand out as troop contributors. For instance, Britain provided troops for the UN Force in Cyprus when it was established in 1964.

The Principle of Non-use of Force

Peacekeepers carry light weapons and use them only as a last resort and in self-defense since they rely on diplomatic means for the solution of the dispute rather than on arms. Therefore, with limited military capability the peacekeepers are not threatening to belligerents. However, some peacekeeping operations that were carried out by the UN necessitated a wider definition of the use of force (for instance, UN Operation in the Congo) for self-defense. “Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council (Goulding, 1996: 16).” In practice, however, most commanders refrained from utilizing this wider definition of self-defense with the concerns that the peacekeeping force might lose its impartial character and that hence the peacekeepers are lightly armed they might be vulnerable targets for attacks from the local parties.

Other than the three basic principles of peacekeeping cited above there are other factors which are also necessary if success is to be ensured. First, peacekeeping operations must have full support from the Security Council. This is necessary not only in the initial stage of establishment of the peacekeeping operation but also in later stages when decisions are to be made regarding budgets, troop allotments and when mandates come up for renewal. Another factor is that the peacekeeping force must have the support and cooperation of the local parties. This is especially crucial if the force is operating in a civil war environment. Although the UN peacekeeping operations in the Cold War era dealt mainly with inter-state conflicts there became instances where the central authority, which gave its consent to the presence of the UN in its territory, lost its control over the whole country thereby leading to a civil war. The presence of a clear and practicable mandate is another must for the success of a peacekeeping operation because such clarity of the mission helps to reduce local suspicion towards the peacekeeping force. Yet a certain degree of flexibility is desirable so that the peacekeepers may adapt their operation strategies to better fit changing circumstances (Roberts, 1995-96: 7-28). Lastly, the Member States should be willing to provide adequate financing for the mission. Because peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter the process through which a peacekeeping operation should be financed remains absent as well. The problem of financing peacekeeping operations began with the establishment of UNEF where the Soviet Union and its European satellites refused to pay for the expenses. The UN operation
in the Congo, which was established in 1960 proved to be a bitter experience for the UN, both in terms of finance and other operational difficulties that the organization almost went bankrupt since the force was deployed without the approval of its budget by the General Assembly. Later on, no peacekeeping operation was deployed without getting its budget approved in the General Assembly. However, the negative outcome of this process was that it slowed down the process of deployment of troops in the crisis regions.

**UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War: Success or Failure?**

As mentioned earlier the founders of the UN envisaged a collective security system to deal with international conflicts. However, the post-World War II order did not permit the utilization of this system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would block any initiative that they conceived to be against their interests through exercising their veto powers in the Security Council. Thus, the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers caused much friction and prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility, that is, maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, peacekeeping emerged as a response to the stalemate between the Permanent Members of the Security Council and it became a substitute for collective security. Peacekeeping was thus “a by-product … of the Cold War; an improvisation in the effort of the UN to transcend or bypass the constraints of the Cold War in search of a role in a specific crisis (Abi-Saab, 1995: 2).

During the Cold War the major contribution of peacekeeping with regards to the maintenance of international peace and security was to contain regional or local conflicts so as to prevent them from escalating into major wars where a direct clash of the two superpowers would be inevitable given the circumstances of the Cold War system. In this sense peacekeeping was highly successful in that it was able to prevent another World War from breaking out.

Yet, UN peacekeeping was not that successful in addressing the root causes of conflicts and laying out plans for long-term political solutions. The peacekeeping missions that have been going on for decades are a good illustration of the weakness of UN peacekeeping in this area. For instance, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to supervise Arab-Israeli truces. After fifty-five years the mission is still in place. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, established in 1964, is still providing a buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek communities of the island of Cyprus. The two peacekeeping missions established in the Middle East in the 1970s, namely the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) –established in 1974- and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) –established in 1978- are also continuing to function today. Therefore, peacekeeping, which started as a mechanism for buying time in order for the diplomats to work on a permanent solution to the conflicts “ended up as a substitute for it, a soft option or alternative for political inaction (Abi-Saab, 1995: 5).” The reason for this political inaction is best explained by Brian Urquhart (Howard and Kingsbury,1993: 78). He states that, “the Security Council, because of its dissensions, had failed to create a benevolent international framework to assist combatants to resolve their differences and to provide the necessary protective apparatus … without such an international framework it is often impossible for the parties to a situation that is violent, deep-rooted and complex to make progress on their own and in the open.”

Thus, the Great Powers were only interested in freezing the conflict so that they would avoid direct confrontation with each other. They were interested in a standstill rather than in really solving the problem, “not to mention that solving the underlying problem would have reduced the dependence of the local parties on the superpowers (Abi-Saab, 1995: 6).” It was not until the end of the 1980s, with the emergence of the cooperative mood in the Security Council, that the UN was able to direct its efforts towards achieving long-term political solutions to the disputes.

Another weakness of UN peacekeeping operations stemmed from the fact that the operations remained distinctly *ad hoc*. That is, the UN did not acquire any military units at its disposal that it would send immediately to areas when the conflicts arose. Propositions were made for the creation of standby forces or a permanent UN force but did not receive much support. Only a few states, namely the Scandinavian countries and Canada, trained their soldiers specifically for peacekeeping.

As a result, peacekeeping which started as an improvised response to the ineffectiveness of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security, proved to be the most effective tool of the UN during the Cold War. The side effect of this mechanism, however, was inaction or lack of incentive to find permanent solutions to crises by the parties. An overall analysis of Cold War UN peacekeeping reveals that the benefits of it should not be undermined. The fact that UN peacekeeping, although with extended scope, is still the major tool
for handling international crises demonstrates the success and commitment of states which lies within that mechanism.

ENDNOTES:

(1) In protest of “Taiwan’s occupation of the ‘Chinese’ seat in spite of the victory by the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedung” (Weiss, et al., 1994: 27) the Soviet delegate did not participate in the meetings of the Security Council.